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THE NATIONAL GUARD -INCREASED OPTEMPO BRINGS PARADIGM CHANGE TO STRATEGIC RESOURCE
Sound military institutions are organic growths and not structures. A sound national defense system is not like a tower of brick and stone that can be built de novo on the surface of the ground. It is, rather, like a living tree with roots deep in the political tradition and history of a nation. It is the province of the military statesman, not to invent something new, but to improve a living thing that already exists. The history of the Guard is both prestigious and heroic. The increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) has brought a new sense of urgency to the Guard. The increased OPTEMPO is not likely to change since the rhetoric in the documents referred to later make specific mention of the Guard's critical and crucial role in our national defense strategy. President Bush's National Security Strategy (NSS) refers to using, "every tool in our arsenal" to defeat the threat.
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The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward in the NMS states, "Successful execution of this strategy will require a truly joint, full spectrum force -a seamless mix of active and reserve forces…" 7 The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that one indication of the increased operational tempo has been the growing reliance on the Reserve Component (RC). 8 The Posture Statements from both the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki 9 and the former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General (R) Russell C.
Davis 10 continue the theme of increased reliance on the RC. It is very clear that the policy documents referred to have described the "ends and means" to the NMS which has changed the paradigm of the National Guard. With the change in paradigm, there has to be consideration for the impact on the soldiers of the National Guard. The question, "Will the increased OPTEMPO of the National Guard, to support the NMS, fatigue this strategic resource to such an extent that the RC will be considered non-mission capable?" needs to be asked. The follow-up discussion to this question needs to take place at all levels in order to address the second and third order effects of the policy change.
Regardless how the Guard evaluates itself, the NMS "ends" are not going to be adjusted to better suit an OPTEMPO for the RC. The nation's NMS clearly has a direction in order to defend the nation. It is the effects of the "ways and means" provided by the RC soldiers which is the focus of concern for this strategy research project. Is the concern for the effects of the increased OPTEMPO and paradigm change to the RC apparent to senior military and political leadership and not just from RC soldiers and their families? In order to seek answers to the concerns an exploration into whether the Department of Defense (DoD), National Guard Bureau (NGB), or other agencies are in fact considering the question, of how the increased OPTEMPO and paradigm change might affect citizen soldiers, revealed important findings.
INCREASED OPTEMPO
The effect of increased OPTEMPO on soldier and unit readiness is an important issue for military and civilian leaders. The reason for this concern is that while the size of the US military has decreased, the frequency of military operations has greatly intensified. 
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The updated schedule identifies the units and dates of six month rotations. Six of the next eight Bosnia rotations place ARNG division headquarters in charge. Prior to General Shinseki approving the updated schedule, the CBO examined four options to restructuring the AC to improve its ability to conduct PKO while staying ready for conventional war. In summary, the report listed four possible ways to restructure the AC force to meet the need for PKO missions During the same period the Total Force concept emerged. The Total Force concept emphasized the increased reliance on the reserves for warfighting. As defense budgets declined, the RC was recognized as a cost-effective way to maintain military capabilities in peacetime.
In the 1990s, force downsizing, along with reduced budgets and rising operational tempo, spurred an increase in the use of the RC. In part this increase occurred to relieve stress on the Active force. It also occurred because the RC was the repository for capabilities needed in the later phases of major theater war.
FUTURE MISSIONS
There is discussion that argues that the capability of the National Guard to assist in routine and contingency planning, consequence management activities and in incident response should be enhanced. 20 The capability to deploy from the U.S. for some of the Guard forces will become a lower priority. First call on designated elements of the Guard force structure may eventually be linked to requirements for WMD and other contingency management within the U.S., and only secondarily to any requirement to deploy on short notice in support of major theater contingency plans. 21 This will require a transformation in thinking on the part of the Guard. The Guard's highest priority would possibly then become pre-attack, attack management, and post-attack contingency management within U.S. borders. Given the increasing threats to the territory, population, and infrastructure of the United States, the RC should play an expanded role in providing homeland defense capabilities. The study suggests new ways for the RC to:
• Assist in managing the consequences of attacks within the United States involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons;
• Protect critical US infrastructure from physical and information operations attacks and;
• Participate in manning a national missile defense system should one be deployed.
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The literature supports the fact U.S. participation in SSCs will continue to be selective, the demand for SSC operations is likely to remain high over the next 15-20 years. Increasing the role of the RC in SSCs where feasible will provide some OPTEMPO relief for the AC, and build RC operational skills. The study recommends new way for the RC to:
• Provide additional high-demand low-density capabilities for SSCs; and
• Assume a greater role in sustained operations like SFOR and KFOR.
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The most stressing requirement for the U.S. military remains our commitment to being able to fight and win two MTWs nearly simultaneously. While substantial portions of the RC are already integral to the warfighting effort, the role of combat units of the Army National Guard (ARNG) can be further clarified.
• Augment critical combat capabilities in specific warfighting areas;
• Develop post-mobilization training standards and deployment timelines for ARNG divisions; and integrate the RC more fully into the deliberate warplans.
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More recently the GAO conducted a study, "DoD Actions Needed to Better Manage
Relations between Reservists and Their Employers." 26 The study, which was in response to a request from the Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, asked the GAO to review the issues and challenges surrounding the increased use of reserve forces. The objectives of the study were: (1) determine how increases in the military operations have affected operational tempos of the RC and (2) assess relations between reservists and their civilian employers. 27 To gain first-hand information on how deployments might be affecting RC soldiers and their employers the report's data set included 870,000 reserve members from which 1608 reservists serving in 22 high OPTEMPO units and 111 employers were surveyed.
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Focus group discussions were also conducted with RC soldiers who had recently deployed. Rebalancing the existing force mix will enhance force capabilities within current end strength. The OASD-RA review evaluated options for improving force capability across the full spectrum of DoD mission requirements. It considered the level of acceptable risk to meet both the challenges that the Services face today and also those that will arise in the future. The concepts presented suggest that the Services may realize greater agility and flexibility in the force by changing the allocations of capabilities between the Active and Reserve components.
Demands on the military are creating constraints and imbalances in force capabilities that can lead to shortages in some areas. The OASD-RA review suggested several approaches for the shortages.
To address platform-based shortages, the review recommends expanding the use of reserves through the use of mixed units to augment the manpower assigned to weapons systems. It is also suggested to upgrade older less capable equipment in reserve units to improve interoperability, address platform shortages, and ease operational burden. To address skills based shortages a deeper pool of either Active or Reserve Component personnel should be created. If military skills are needed intermittently or for surge requirements, then a larger Reserve Component rotational pool should be created. To ease shortages in civilian acquired skills, that are hard to develop and retain in the AC force, the review suggested an increase in the rotational pool in the RC.
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HLS is receiving priority focus across the federal government. While the precise roles and missions of the many agencies involved are being determined, it is certain that the DoD, including the RC, will have an important role.
Another area considered by the OASD-RA review was that of changing priorities for traditional missions. The RC has been the repository for the forces needed for major combat operations. Converting some ARNG heavy combat forces to more flexible, multi-purpose forces, while the AC is incorporating similar concepts, needs to be accelerated. Initial stages of smaller scale contingencies often require an immediate response that cannot be provided by some types of RC units. In the later stages of the small scale contingencies the Guard and
Reserve forces can shoulder a greater load. While in peacetime operations, Guard and
Reserve forces can support AC in forward presence and PFO.
In addition to expanding force capability through rebalancing the OASD-RA review suggested creating flexibility in force management. A capabilities-based force, which can quickly respond to unknown requirements in the future, requires a new approach to force management and organization. The DoD could more effectively employ its force, both AC and RC, across the full range of operational requirements if it adopted a new availability and service paradigm -a continuum of service Bush administration has opposed efforts in Congress to increase personnel, arguing that the military can reduce the burden of deployments just by making adjustments in how the current force is used. The administration is also pushing privatization of some jobs in order to save money.
CONCLUSIONS
It is apparent from the review of the literature that the senior military and political leadership do have a grasp of the increased OPTEMPO and the need for paradigm change of the RC is on the top burner. The literature suggests that the senior military and political leadership are investigating ways to make the RC an even more integral part of the NMS. Reallocating units between the AC and RC to better meet the current mission needs along with fixing the interoperability of equipment seem to be the most pressing items. Other agencies as well as the leadership talk about the concern they have for the increased OPTEMPO and paradigm change that is facing the RC. Action plans addressing fixes to the second and third order effects; health care upon activation, employer conflicts, student conflicts, RC unit fragmentation through deployments, and recruiting and retention issues, to name several, have not yet taken shape. The bureaucracy of government is not keeping pace with the increased OPTEMPO of the RC soldiers needs. The citizen-soldier is a reflection of our society and that is why the senior military and political leadership need to take action to avert societies' discontent with what appear to be major issues concerning RC soldiers.
In order to understand the magnitude of the RC concern the bureaucracy should re-visit Clausewitz's remarkable "trinity of war". 43 The trinity's premise is that the social, political and In order to achieve the intent of Brig. Gen. McAuley Palmer's metaphor, "It is the province of the military statesman, not to invent something new, but to improve a living thing that already exists.", I believe there needs to be serious consideration of the second and third order effects to the increased reliance and OPTEMPO of the Guard in support of the NMS. The fact that the
